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BIOPROSPECTING LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: WHAT WE ARE DOING, WHAT WE ARE 
NOT DOING, AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT 
EMILY J. STOLFER* 
ABSTRACT 
Bioprospecting is a growing worldwide effort to protect knowledge and the 
environment. With its potential economic benefit and technological advancements, 
bioprospecting will continue to grow as the world advances. Other nations have 
begun to protect the information available and continue to develop legislation. 
However, the United States has been hesitant to ratify international treaties or 
implement its own legislation. This Note examines both domestic and international 
efforts to protect both indigenous people and the environment. It analyzes the 
legislation the United States currently has in place but also examines where the 
United States is lacking. Regarding the United States’ failure to implement national 
legislation, this Note analyzes how two states that have tried to implement local 
bioprospecting legislation, instead. Finally, this Note makes a recommendation of 
what the United States or individual states should do in the future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In Leonardo DiCaprio’s acceptance speech for Best Actor in a Drama at the 2016 
Golden Globes, he ended his remarks by stating, “It is time that we recognize your 
history and that we protect your indigenous lands from corporate interests and 
people that are out there to exploit them. It is time that we heard your voice and 
protected this planet for future generations.”1 One of the biggest threats to these 
                                                            
 * J.D., expected May 2017. B.A. in Communications and Political Science from John 
Carroll University. Emily would like to thank her parents, Anne and Greg, for all of their love 
and support throughout the years. Your love is not quantifiable; thank you for that. Also, 
thank you to Gregory and Matthew for being awesome siblings and teaching me the 
importance of bird law. Finally, thank you to my friends for all of the laughter.  
 1  NBC, Leonardo DiCaprio Wins Best Actor in a Drama at the 2016 Golden Globes, 
YOUTUBE (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ncgFQAISaGo. For a more in-
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lands is bioprospecting. Bioprospecting has many definitions, as stated below, but 
generally it is “searching wild plants, animals and microorganisms—that is, 
biodiversity—for genetic and biochemical information.”2 Environmental issues have 
been at the forefront of policy discussions, and with most of the focus on global 
warming and sustainable green energy, other environmental issues that are just as 
important get placed on the backburner.3 
 Bioprospecting has many definitions. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) defines it as “the exploration of biodiversity for commercially valuable 
genetic and biochemical resources.”4 Each definition can vary significantly but 
contains the same framework.5 For example, one definition states, “Bioprospecting 
involves searching for, collecting, and deriving genetic material from samples of 
biodiversity that can be used in commercialized pharmaceutical, agricultural, 
industrial, or chemical processing end products.”6 The bioprospecting definitions 
usually contain the concept of gathering or collecting genetic material found in 
nature that may be used for value.7  
                                                            
depth analysis of indigenous tribes, see Erik B. Bluemel, Separating Instrumental from 
Intrinsic Rights: Toward an Understanding of Indigenous Participation in International Rule-
Making, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 55 (2006) [hereinafter Bluemel, Separating Instrumental from 
Intrinsic]; Nancy Kremers, Speaking with a Forked Tongue in the Global Debate on 
Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Are U.S. Intellectual Property Law and Policy 
Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for Native American Cultures?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004); Jennifer Amiott, Investigating the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’s Protections for Traditional Knowledge, 11 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 3 (2003).  
 2  Andrea Aseff, First Federal Prohibition on Bioprospecting Within a Place of 
Protection: Time to Spur the Legislative Dialogue, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 189, 
190 (2011) (citing John R. Adair, The Bioprospecting Question: Should the United States 
Charge Biotechnology Companies for the Commercial Use of Public Wild Genetic Resources, 
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131, 132-33 (1997)). 
 3  This paper mostly will discuss bioprospecting, which is the legal form of biopiracy, but 
in some academic literature these terms are used interchangeably. Biopiracy is referred to as 
“the appropriation of the knowledge and genetic resources of farming and indigenous 
communities by individuals or institutions that seek exclusive monopoly control . . . over these 
resources and knowledge.” Patents & Biopiracy, ETC GRP., 
http://www.etcgroup.org/issues/patents-biopiracy (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).  
 4  Lydia Slobodian et al., Bioprospecting in the Global Commons: Legal Issues Brief 1, 
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/Biosprecting-Issuepaper.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 
2016).  
 5  Compare Slobodian et al., supra note 4, with Peter G. Pan, Bioprospecting: Issues and 
Policy Considerations iv, LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU (2006), 
http://lrbhawaii.info/lrbrpts/05/biocon.pdf.  
 6  Pan, supra note 5; see also Nuala Moran, Microbial Wealth: Bioprospecting the 
Microbial Communities That Colonize Our Bodies is Starting to Throw Up Opportunities for 
Commercial Exploitation of the Microbiome 22, CHEMISTRY & INDUS. (2014) (“We can push 
the gut microbiota in a health-promoting and health-sustaining way . . . We are not talking 
about probiotics, but products that will be put through clinical trials”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 7  See Bioprospectors Feel Backlash in Hawaii: Patents on Taro Plant Outrage Some 
Who See it as a Sacred Symbol, NBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2006), 
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Anything with a commercial value has the opportunity to be exploited without 
the right protection and especially when the plant or organism in its original state can 
be extremely profitable.8 If companies have unregulated, unlimited access to these 
resources, the biodiversity they need for new biotechnologies will be destroyed, and 
“‘the wonderfully unusual accomplishment of discovering and eradicating in the 
same instant a new species’”9 will become a reality. Even though the practice of 
bioprospecting has been around for over one hundred years,10 the potential profits 
that nanotech and biotechnological companies seek from bioprospecting are 
relatively new due to society’s technological advances.11 For example, in South 
Africa, the government established the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR) to help individuals, including indigenous groups, obtain patents.12 The San 
People of South Africa used CSIR to develop the active ingredient in the Hoodia 
cactus.13 However, the CSIR sold the patent information to a British pharmaceutical 
company, leaving the San People incapable of receiving profits from benefit 
sharing.14 Without regulations, both the environment and individuals can be robbed 
of their rights due to commercial greed.15   
                                                            
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/10945323/ns/technology_and_science-science/t/bioprospectors-
feel-backlash-hawaii/#.V9YMYlUrLIU (explaining key ingredients to medication were found 
through bioprospecting processes, like drugs for breast cancer and painkillers). 
 8  See Gina Kolata, In Ancient Times, Flowers and Fennel for Family Planning, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 8, 1994, at C10 (explaining that the Romans used silphium, a plant, “to prevent 
pregnancies and induce abortions”). Silphium perhaps was effective almost 100 percent of the 
time, as evident from recent studies of rats ingesting a similar plant. Id. Romans used silphium 
so much that they drove the plant to extinction. Id. 
 9  Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending Conventional Wisdom on the 
Relationship Between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, 31 ELR 10625 (2001) 
(citing BILL BRYSON, A WALK IN THE WOODS: REDISCOVERING AMERICA ON THE APPALACHIAN 
TRAIL 92 (1998)).  
 10  See Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 93 F.Supp.2d 63, 65 (2000) (“[T]he earliest research 
permit authorizing collection of microbial samples from Yellowstone was in 1898.”).    
 11  Genecore International Inc., a profitable biotechnology company, earned “$13 million 
in the first quarter of 2004 on $94 million in Revenue.” Bioprospecting in Nature Fuels 
Debate, NBC NEWS (Jul. 7, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5295305/ns/us_news-
environment/t/bioprospecting-nature-fuels-debate/#.V89JJ62xnVJ.  
 12  Tak Jong Kim, Expanding the Arsenal Against Biopiracy: Application of the  
Concession Agreement Framework to Prevent Misappropriation of Biodiversity, 14 
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 69 (2010). 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id.  
 15  How Does Biodiversity Loss Affect Me and Everyone Else?, WORLD WIDE FUND FOR 
NATURE, http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/biodiversity/biodiversity_and_you/ (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2016) [hereinafter WWF]. Ecosystem surveys are valued to an estimated 
amount of $33 trillion per year, which is more than the United States’ and the European 
Union’s combined GDP for the year. Approximately 50,000 to 70,000 plant species are used 
in medicine and about 100 million metric tons of aquatic life are harvested every year. A 
significant loss of biodiversity would greatly damage the international ecosystem.  
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Biodiversity loss greatly threatens human wellness, especially in developing 
parts of the world, where water and food sources, the bare necessities of human 
survival, are sparse.16 Biodiversity is the underpinning of all life and necessary for 
human survival.17 Biodiversity is currently eroding at significant rates (twenty to 
fifty percent) due to human use,18 and the erosion is most significant in undeveloped 
or developing areas.19 Without biodiversity, our lifeline of food and water will not be 
able to sustain future populations, which could lead to resource wars, creating a true 
game of survival of the fittest.20  
This Note will address four different ways the United States has tried to regulate 
bioprospecting internationally and domestically. It will then analyze the pros and 
cons of the bioprospecting regulations and suggest a federal call to national 
bioprospecting legislation with a presentation of specific legislation to help protect a 
state’s individual interests, encompassing the public and private property rights of 
both the government and individuals.21 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Convention on Biological Diversity 
The CBD was adopted in 1992 to help conserve biological diversity and establish 
rules for fair and equitable benefits for sharing genetic resources.22 In the CBD’s 
quest to help preserve biodiversity, the convention addressed the topics above as 
well as intellectual property rights concerning the biotechnology derived from 
genetic resources.23 The CBD noticed that biological diversity is a key asset to our 
society for both present and future generations.24  Current unregulated practices 
                                                            
 16  Sandra Diaz et al., Biodiversity Loss Threatens Human Well-Being, PLOS (Aug. 15, 
2006), http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.0040277 
(“[E]cosystem services may decrease the quality of life of these vulnerable population . . .  
Biodiversity change is therefore inextricably like to poverty.”). 
 17  WWF, supra note 15. 
 18  NEVILLE ASH & ASHGAR FAZEL, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 4 (GEO-4): 
ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 162 (Neville Ash & Asghar Mohammadi Fazel eds., 2007). 
 19  Id. at 160. 
 20  INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., CONSERVING THE PEACE: RESOURCES, LIVELIHOODS AND 
SECURITY 34-35 (Richard Matthew et al. eds., 2002). 
 21  As later presented, each state may have individual interests it would like to protect, 
especially if the state is particularly rich in biodiversity (for example, Hawaii and Alaska). See 
infra Part II(D).  
 22  History of the Convention, CBD, https://www.cbd.int/history/ (last visited Oct. 13, 
2015); Chen, supra note 9, at 10630. Chen states, “If even casual hiking affects the 
distribution of population of wildlife, purposeful bioprospecting expeditions can leave a deep 
human footprint.  The need for government intervention is far more urgent in the biosphere 
than in the ionosphere; unlike the supposedly ‘scarce’ but physically inexhaustible 
electromagnetic spectrum, natural resources can be depleted through unpatrolled 
exploitation.” 
 23  Guri Bang, Signed But Not Ratified: Limits to U.S. Participation in International 
Environmental Agreements, 28 REVIEW OF POL’Y RESEARCH 65, 72-73 (2011). 
 24  History of the Convention, supra note 22. 
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continue to deplete the Earth’s biodiversity; the CBD only has five of its indicators 
making sufficient progress while sixteen currently show negative trends.25  
Specifically, in the Amazon, up to 8,700 species of trees are endangered due to 
deforestation, and the proportion of plants that are endangered has increased to one-
fifth.26  
As of today, 196 countries have signed onto the CBD and its mission.27 However, 
the U.S. is not a party to the CBD.28 Even though President Bill Clinton signed the 
CBD in 1993, Congress failed to ratify because it would rather “deal with trade-
related issues with environmental implication in the WTO [World Trade 
Organization] rather than in international environmental regimes.”29 Clinton signed 
the CBD because the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) did not address the biological diversity concerns highlighted in the 
CBD.30 Congress’s concern was the opposite. Congress thought the CBD did not 
properly address intellectual property rights, private property rights, or consequences 
for land use polices.31 Although the Senate had a simple majority in favor of the 
CBD, it did not have the votes to ratify.32 The Senate, moreover, has not voted to 
ratify since 1994.33 The U.S. concern of the CBD not addressing intellectual and 
private property rights shows the controversy between the need for biotechnological 
advancement and the protection of biodiversity.34 The TRIPS agreement does not 
address Congress’s concerns of land use policies, private property, or financing the 
project, which Congress stated was similar to the problems it encountered with the 
Endangered Species Act.35 Congress did not want tougher land-use policies that 
would interfere with the rights of landowners, specifically ranchers and farmers.36   
                                                            
 25  G7 ELMAU PROGRESS REPORT, BIODIVERSITY—A VITAL FOUNDATION FOR A 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2015), http://www.bmz.de/g7/includes/Downloadarchiv/G7-
Elmau-Progress-Report-2015-Biodiversity-A-vital-foundation-for-sustainable-
development.pdf.  
 26  Half of the Amazonian Tree Species are Endangered, SCI. DAILY (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/02/160210111733.htm. 
 27  List of Parties, CBD, https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml#tab=0  (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2016).  
 28  Pan, supra note 5, at 24. 
 29  Bang, supra note 23, at 72. 
 30  Id. at 73. 
 31  Id. at 74. 
 32  Id. at 75. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Chen, supra note 9. 
 35  Bang, supra note 23, at 75. 
 36  Id. 
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The CBD helps protect developing countries and indigenous groups through 
protocols, such as prior informed consent (PIC).37 PIC is a two-step process.38 First, 
it requires the bioprospector to obtain permission per a nation’s protocol.39  Second, 
the bioprospector must obtain this permission from the specific community where 
they are extracting materials. 40 PIC requires an understanding of what the researcher 
or company is doing within the community.41 It also requires the bioprospector to 
enter a written agreement with the community stating that the community 
understands what will be taking place.42 Usually, other benefit-sharing provisions are 
also discussed during the PIC process and can be put into a contract with the native 
tribes or landowners. The U.S. does not require PIC, allowing companies to “engage 
in biopiracy, patent any invention . . . resulting from the research on stolen biological 
resources and innovations, and prohibit other nations from utilizing their own 
resources.”43  Without PIC protections, individual bioprospectors can independently 
contract without a landowner’s permission and without fully explaining what the 
bioprospector will do on the land.44 This is similar to the problem with fracking, 
which is loosely regulated.45 Similar to bioprospecting, fracking has no 
comprehensive regulatory regime.46 Private actors protect themselves through private 
laws even though their actions have an adverse effect on the environment and 
public.47 This legally allows companies to extract materials from nature without 
permission from areas except national parks, such as Utah and certain parts of 
Hawaii.48 But usually, laws derived from the CBD discourage companies from 
investing in bioprospecting.49 
                                                            
 37  U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON FREE, PRIOR, AND 
INFORMED CONSENT AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: CONTRIBUTION OF THE CONVENTION ON 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 1 (2005).    
 38  Id. at 5.  
 39  Id. 
 40  Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological Promise: The 
International Conflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life, 98 A.J.I.L. 641, 649 (2004). 
 41  Id. at 654-55. 
 42  Id. at 654. 
 43  Laura Grebe, Requiring Genetic Source Disclosure in the United States, 44 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 367, 369 (2011). 
 44  Id. at 384. 
 45  See Shalanda Helen Baker, Is Fracking the Next Financial Crisis? A Development Lens 
for Understanding Systemic Risk and Governance, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 229 (2015). 
 46  Id. at 237.  
 47  Id. at 254-55 (noting that one of the harms of fracking is the leaking of natural gas and 
fracking fluid to mix with the water supply). 
 48  Id. at 256. 
 49  Safrin, supra note 40, at 668. Some argue that due to the decline in biodiversity, there 
is a need to develop technologies and pharmaceuticals prior to the depletion of the resources. 
See Aseff, supra note 2, at 197.  
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The CBD sets guidelines for countries to follow when creating legislation to 
protect both biodiversity and the rights of an area’s indigenous people.50 The 
majority of the countries belonging to the CBD are developing countries, which are 
seeking to protect themselves from corporate exploitation.51 
B. Nagoya 
The CBD’s most recent attempt for the conservation of biological diversity and 
benefit-sharing of genetic material between countries is the Nagoya Protocol.52 
Unlike the CBD, only sixty-eight countries have signed onto the Nagoya Protocol.53 
There are three obligations each participating state must meet: (1) access to genetic 
resources, (2) benefit-sharing, and (3) compliance.54 Each obligation has its own 
rules for nations to follow.55 Most countries that have agreed to the CBD also have 
agreed to the Nagoya Protocol.56 
To gain access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge,57 collectors must 
obtain prior informed consent from the community or indigenous tribe, and both 
                                                            
 50  Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts 
with Global Patent Policies, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 433, 473 (2006). 
 51  List of Parties, supra note 27.  See Lessons from Bioprospecting in India and Nigeria, 
CULTURAL SURVIVAL (2000), 
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/lessons-bioprospecting-india-and-
nigeria (demonstrating that India, for example started the Tropical Botanic Garden and 
Research Institute (TBGRI) which helped collaborated with the Kani tribe and started a profit 
sharing program of fifty percent of the licensing fee and two percent royalty on profits). 
TBGRI knew it did not reach out to all of the members, so they put the profits in a trust. Id. 
The Kani tribe continues to profit from the agreement with the TBGRI. Id. Due to the CBD 
the Kani tribe is allowed to deny such activity today if it wants. Id. 
 52  Matthias Buck & Clare Hamilton, The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, 20 RECIEL 47, 47 (2011); see also Vanessa Danley, 
Biopiracy in the Brazilian Amazon: Learning from International and Comparative Law 
Successes and Shortcomings to Help Promote Biodiversity Conservation in Brazil, 7 FLA. A & 
M UNIV. L. REV. 2, 302 (2012) (“The Nagoya Protocol’s main goal is to ensure that the parties 
to the agreement are adopting the benefit-sharing provision of the CBD.”). 
 53  List of Parties, supra note 27. 
 54  About the Nayoga Protocol, CBD, https://www.cbd.int/abs/about/default.shtml/ (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
 55  Id.  
 56  Dr. Konstantia Koutouki & Katharina Rogalla von Bieberstein, The Nagoya Protocol: 
Sustainable Access and Benefits-Sharing for Indigenous and Local Communities, 13 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 513, 528-29 (2012). The United States has not agreed to the Nagoya Protocol.  
 57  See Traditional Knowledge Innovations and Practice, CBD, 
https://www.cbd.int/traditional/intro.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (“Traditional 
knowledge refers to the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities around the world. Developed from experience gained over the centuries and 
adapted to the local culture and environment, traditional knowledge is transmitted orally from 
generation to generation.”). 
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parties must agree on the established terms. 58 How that consent is handled is 
undefined.59 It is up to the individual nations or parties to legislate accordingly.60 
There are precautions in place to help the traditional knowledge holders or 
indigenous tribes; such precautions include understanding the bioprospector’s 
proposition or that a community has the right to say “no.”61 The communities also 
must agree upon benefit sharing.62 Not all the words within the Nagoya Protocol are 
defined.63 For example, utilization is not defined, which could be a weak point in the 
protocol.64 But each country’s ability to make its own rules, following the framework 
of Nagoya, can define the extra terms and change laws that are not having the 
intended effect.65 Bioprospecting legislation should be analyzed annually to see if the 
legislation has the intended effect.66 
The last step a nation must take is to make sure bioprospectors are complying 
with the country’s regulations for gathering genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge.67 Regulations include upholding contracts, PIC, and settling any 
contractual violations or changes a party may want to make to the contract.68  
Nagoya added extra precautions to protect indigenous and local communities.69 
Nagoya’s additional protections were a significant step in developing international 
biodiversity policy.70  However, a weakness of Nagoya lies within its enforcement 
mechanisms; enforcement depends on any given nation’s willingness to act on it.71  
This leaves communities and nations vulnerable to exploitation by bioprospectors, 
especially when a nation does not hold the indigenous group in high regard or when 
there is a lack of enforcement due to a lack of resources.72 Nevertheless, the Nagoya 
                                                            
 58  Buck & Hamilton, supra note 52, at 54. 
 59  See id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id.; see also About the Nayoga Protocol, supra note 54. 
 62  Buck & Hamilton, supra note 52, at 55. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id.  
 65  Jorge Cabrera Medaglia et al., The Interface Between the Nagoya Protocol on ABS and 
the ITPGRFA at the International Level: Potential Issues for Consideration in Supporting 
Mutually Supporting Implementation at the National Level, FNI REPORT (2013), 
http://www.fni.no/pdf/FNI-R0113.pdf. 
 66  See Jane Maienschein et al., Articles, Biology and Law: Challenges of Adjudicating 
Competing Claims in a Democracy, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 151, 156 (1998) (“[S]cientific 
knowledge can change rapidly, which can be a problem for legal and political processes . . . 
the process of doing science creates a changeable set of specific evidentiary claims.”). 
 67  About the Nayoga Protocol, supra note 54. 
 68  Id.  
 69  Buck & Hamilton, supra note 52, at 54. 
 70  Id. at 60; see also Koutouki & Rogalla von Bieberstein, supra note 56, at 535. 
 71  Koutouki & Rogalla von Bieberstein, supra note 56, at 531. 
 72  Id. at 531. 
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Protocol is promising because it overcomes differences in global environmental 
politics, showing a strong effort for regrowth in not only nature but relations as 
well.73  
C. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
The U.S. has decided to use TRIPS instead of the CBD because of its focus on 
the patenting of new biotechnology discoveries.74 The U.S. has many companies that 
are focused on biotechnologies. The prevalence of biotechnology companies 
strengthens the economy and, therefore, is important to policymakers.75  RIPS 
globally recognizes different patents and requires all participating nations to 
recognize patent rights of genetic and plant resources.76 Primarily, developing 
countries have attempted to put limits on how material for the patents can be 
acquired.77 However, the U.S. and foreign developing countries do not agree so long 
as they follow the patent process for the country.78 The U.S. has continued to favor 
TRIPS due to its prioritization of intellectual property rights.79 
TRIPS currently requires countries to issue patents for a patentable product.80 
The requirement for patents holds true even if the patentable product violated access 
rules of the country, so long as they “involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application.”81  This shows that countries that prioritize the TRIPS 
agreement over the CBD are not concerned about indigenous peoples’ rights or the 
need to address the mass biodiversity loss.  Rather, such countries are more 
concerned about patents and commercial innovation based on resources that may 
have been obtained through unethical means, such as not fully disclosing the extent 
to which corporations may take from the land or finding loopholes to benefit sharing 
contracts, which are extremely difficult to enforce.82 Innovation in the U.S. has 
                                                            
 73  Buck & Hamilton, supra note 52, at 61. 
 74  Grebe, supra note 43, at 369.  
 75  See Mark Terry, In Public-Private Deal, New York State Invests $225 Million and 
Athenex Invests $1.62 Billion to Create 1,400 Jobs, BIOSPACE (Feb. 11, 2016), 
http://www.biospace.com/News/in-public-private-deal-new-york-state-invests-
225/408642?intcid=homepage-seekercarousel-featurednews-navindex1 (“We have been 
incredibly impressed by Governor Cuomo’s leadership to attract significant new jobs within 
New York State . . . [h]is commitment to economic development has successfully permeated 
an impressive ‘Open for Business’ culture we have not see [sic] anywhere else.”). 
 76  Grebe, supra note 43, at 384. 
 77  Safrin, supra note 40, at 666-67.  
 78  Id. at 667. 
 79  See generally Grebe, supra note 43. 
 80  Safrin, supra note 40, at 667.  
 81  Id. 
 82  See Nicola Lucchi, Understanding Genetic Information as a Commons: From 
Bioprospecting to Personalized Medicine, 7 INT’L J. COMMONS 313, 332 (2013) (“‘Patent 
protection is . . . a two-edged sword.’ On one side, ‘the promise of exclusive rights provides 
monetary incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery.’ On the other side, ‘that 
very exclusivity can impeded the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, 
invention.’”). 
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always been favored, especially since it is closely associated with “the American 
Dream” mentality.83 Thus, not regulating bioprospecting gives corporations room for 
innovation and exploitation of both goods and people without consequences.   
TRIPS sets forth guidelines for individuals filing patents, and each country 
models its own set of rules to meet its needs.84 Each country’s provisions must fall 
within three categories:  (1) intellectual standards, (2) domestic enforcement, and (3) 
settle disputes amongst its members.85 TRIPS binds nations with only its minimum 
standard requirements, ignoring the requirements of the CBD, so the only way to 
incorporate the two is either have the WTO incorporate the CBD or have each 
individual country make the CBD a part of its patent filing processes.86  However, 
the main reason countries like the U.S. prefer the TRIPS agreement is due to the 
loose standards and enforcement policies for when a dispute occurs between 
countries.87  If an inventor wants a patent approved in a country, the inventor must 
file it according to that country’s specifications.88 The U.S. is no different.89 The 
TRIPS agreement is not bulletproof because developing countries have been copying 
other countries’ patents.90 For example, Brazil copies pharmaceutical patents.91 
Authors have already suggested incorporating PIC into the U.S. TRIPS patent 
process.  Even though naturally-occurring resources cannot be patented, which 
includes traditional knowledge, “TRIPS effectively allows biopiracy to occur, since 
products of nature are not protected by TRIPS.”92 Scientists can extract the material 
from a natural substance and turn it into a medical advancement, changing the 
naturally occurring material into a profitable patent.93 For example, if PIC was 
included under TRIPS and applied to all possible afflicted parties, not limited to 
national governments, it could be the gateway into granting property rights to 
citizens and traditional knowledge benefits to indigenous groups.94 Even though the 
                                                            
 83  Safrin, supra note 40, at 674. 
 84  Nuno Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman’s Hut to the Patent Office: In Search of a 
TRIPS-Consistent Requirement to Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior 
Informed Consent, 17 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 111, 125-26 (2005). 
 85  Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2016),  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm. 
 86  Carvalho, supra note 84, at 128. 
 87  See id. at 186. 
 88  See id. at 126. 
 89  See id.  
 90  See Erik B. Bluemel, Substance Without Process: Analyzing TRIPS Participatory 
Guarantees in Light of Protected Indigenous Rights, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
671, 686-87 (2004) [hereinafter Bluemel, Substance Without Process]. 
 91  See Carolyn S. Corn, Pharmaceutical Patents in Brazil: Is Compulsory Licensing the 
Solution?, 9 B.U. INT’L L.J. 71, 71-75 (1991). 
 92  Bluemel, Substance Without Process, supra note 90, at 684-86. 
 93  See id. at 686. 
 94  Id. at 694-95.  
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U.S. does not allow for substances occurring in nature not to be patented in that 
form,95 this does not mean other nations follow the same guidelines.96 
Although PIC is mentioned under TRIPS, the protocol is not required in the 
agreement and, therefore, is not necessary for enforcement unless the rules from the 
country require it.97  Since PIC is not within the agreement part of TRIPS, the U.S. is 
not required to incorporate it into its patent legislation and has not required it yet.98 
The U.S failure to require PIC has the consequence of allowing biopiracy findings—
microorganisms or active chemical ingredients with highly profitable potential 
retrieved through exploiting land or traditional knowledge of an indigenous tribe—to 
be eligible patent material within the U.S.99 Also, if one of the following regulations 
does not function properly, a researcher may bioprospect on public grounds in the 
U.S., making all public land open to exploitation.  
D. U.S. Bioprospecting Legislation and Precedent 
The U.S. has taken some action concerning bioprospecting legislation. The 
earliest U.S. action was the case of Edmonds Institute v. Babbit, in which 
Yellowstone National Park initially tried to implement the first bioprospecting 
agreement within its park.100 Hawaii and Utah have also enacted, or attempted to 
enact, legislation to help regulate bioprospecting on public grounds.101 Below are 
descriptions of such actions.102 
1. Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt and National Park Regulation 
Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt is the only case to establish precedent for 
bioprospecting in the U.S. National Parks.103 In 1999, plaintiffs first brought the case 
challenging the Department of the Interior’s authority to enter into a commercial 
bioprospecting agreement with Diversa Corporation (Diversa)104 at Yellowstone 
                                                            
 95  See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (“Congress thus recognized 
that the relevant distinction was . . . between products of nature, whether living or not, and 
human-made inventions.”). 
 96  See Bluemel, Substance Without Process, supra note 90, at 686. 
 97  Id. at 693-94. 
 98  Grebe, supra note 43, at 389-90; see also Chen, supra note 9, at 10639. 
 99  Grebe, supra note 43, at 389-90. 
 100  Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 101  Eric Goldman, Utah Passes Nation’s First (?) Bioprospecting Regulation, TECH. AND 
MARKETING L. BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/03/utah_passes_nat.htm. 
 102  See infra notes 106-81. 
 103  Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 9. 
 104  See id. at 2. Diversa Corporation is a San Diego based biotechnology company. The 
plaintiffs in the case were Edmonds Institute (a nonprofit public interest organization), 
Alliance for the Wild Rockies (a nonprofit organization to preserve native biodiversity), 
International Center for Technology Assessment (a nonprofit organization focused on the 
ethical issues in the biotechnology industry), and Phil Knight, a resident of Bozeman, 
Montana. Id. at 9. 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
112 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:101 
 
National Park.105 The Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) 
was the first bioprospecting legislation entered into on behalf of the parks.106 Prior to 
CRADA, park services received no benefit from any derivative park products.107 The 
Yellowstone-Diversa CRADA included benefit-sharing practices and revenues if 
Diversa commercially benefited from any research deriving from the 
microorganisms collected from Yellowstone.108 Also, Diversa agreed to make annual 
payments of around $20,000 to Park Services and provide research equipment for the 
park to use.109  
Prior to CRADA, any researcher could remove specimen from the park with a 
permit and develop it if he or she wished.110 Yellowstone already has examples of 
unique genetic material with commercial application, such as thermos aquaticus, a 
heat-resistant bacterium.111 The environmental impact assessment is especially 
important because of the potential to exploit natural resources for commercial 
gain.112 A court makes the distinction between commercial and research activity in 
stating that, “There is an undeniable reality that commercial activity is qualitatively 
different than scientific and educational activity of a similar nature, due to the very 
different forces and motivations that drive them.”113 Due to the profitable nature of 
bioprospecting, exploitation is bound to happen unless there are safeguards in place 
                                                            
 105  Id. at 4. 
 106  Id.  
 107  Id. at 5. Yellowstone has had commercial derivative products, such as the Taq 
polymerase, that are profitable. Id. The Taq polymerase patent sold for an estimated $300 
million and generates about $100 million a year. Id. The current patent holder offered to 
contribute to the park; however, Yellowstone denied because it was uncertain about the 
legality of the transaction. Id.   
 108  Id. at 2-3, 5 (“The Park has indicated that it will receive royalties of between .5% and 
10% depending upon the nature of the raw material and the final product.”). 
 109  Id. at 5.  
 110  Todd Weaver, Bioprospecting in the National Parks: Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt, 42 
JURIMETRICS J. 61, 67 (2001).  
 111  Safrin, supra note 40, at 682 (citing Adair, supra note 2, at 141); see also Chelsea 
DeWeese, Mysterious Microbes: How Yellowstone’s Thermophiles Affect All of Us, 
YELLOWSTONE Q. (Spring 2015). 
 112  See Aseff, supra note 2, at 201-02 (“Protected public land and natural resources 
provide raw material for the bioprospectors, while patent law opens the door for commercial 
exploitation, inevitably raising concerns about line drawing and the ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ dilemma.”). 
 113  Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 13; see also Lonie R. Boens, Note, Edmonds Institute 
v. Babbitt: Bioprospecting on Federal Lands, Public Loss or Public Gain?, 4 GREAT PLAINS 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 50, 58 (1999) (“The commercial component of bioprospecting is driven by 
self-interest profit incentives which have the potential to overshadow the more altruistic 
conservation component of the industry. The lure of extensive profits subjects bioprospecting 
to abuse.”).  
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prior.114 Thankfully, the National Park Service has such protection through 
legislation.115 
The Edmonds court defined bioprospecting as “a relatively new method of 
natural resource exploitation . . . that targets microscopic resources—the genetic and 
biochemical information found in wild plants, animals, and microorganisms.”116 This 
is a very narrow definition, and even though the court alluded to the fundamental 
understanding of “timber harvesting, mining, hunting, and grazing,”117 it purposely 
did not include it because those activities are using the materials themselves as the 
commercial gains and not the scientifically-derived material.118 The court also 
pointed to the lack of a definitive policy statement of bioprospecting through 
regulations or less formal means.119 
In Edmonds, the plaintiffs brought suit because the National Park Service failed 
to provide public notice of the changes brought by the agreement and did not 
perform an environmental impact assessment of the agreement, which is required by 
law.120 The plaintiffs alleged that human intrusion around features like the thermal 
geysers disrupted the aesthetic enjoyment of the park.121 Plaintiffs also alleged the 
Park Service violated the Federal Technology Transfer Act (FTTA), the National 
Park Service Organic Act (NPSOA), the Yellowstone National Park Organic Act 
(YOA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the public trust 
doctrine.122 The court only decided that the plaintiffs proved the agreement between 
Diversa and Yellowstone was against public interest of the Park and that the 
Yellowstone-Diversa CRADA would be suspended on completion of an 
environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement.123   
The D.C. District Court heard Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt again, deciding whether 
the Department of the Interior’s “entry into a research agreement with a private 
biotechnology company for the ‘bioprospecting’ of microbial organisms from . . . 
                                                            
 114  See Aseff, supra note 2, at 190, 201. 
 115  The National Park Service Organic Act provides that the purposed of the parks are “to 
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein . . . by such 
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” 54 U.S.C. § 
100101 (2016) et. seq; see also Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 93 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69-70 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
 116  Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d. at 6. 
 117  Id. at 5-6.  
 118  Id. at 11-12 (“[D]efendants concede, the collection of microbial samples, while not 
rising to the level of strip mining or timber harvesting, does involve some intrusion into 
delicate ecosystems around Yellowstone’s thermal features.”).  
 119  Id. at 9.  
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. at 11-12. 
 122  Weaver, supra note 110, at 62.  
 123  See Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. at 20; see also Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jenson, 108 
F.3d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ommercial fishing is statutorily prohibited only in the 
Park’s designated wilderness areas.”).  
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Yellowstone” was arbitrary and capricious.124 The arbitrary and capricious standard 
is “‘highly deferential’ and presumes the validity of agency action.”125 When 
construing the language of the statutes in question, the court stated, “CRADA is 
consistent with Congressional intent regarding cooperative scientific research 
agreements with units of the National Park System.”126  
The court wrote that CRADA was not against the intent of the statute because the 
“‘commercial use’ flowing from such research is limited to applications or products 
generated from the scientific study of the resources, not the resources themselves.”127 
The court also recognized a park’s ability to construe the regulations to meet the 
park’s own requirements.128 Even the Solicitor recommended the essence of CRADA 
be placed within the permit process for research itself in order to help regulate the 
commercial benefits from products derived as a result of research throughout the 
National Park System.129 This addition would remove the arbitrary and capricious 
standard so long as Park System gives equal opportunity for organizations to apply 
for the CRADA after they have applied for a permit. Because only approximately 
forty to fifty of the research permits are for microbial research, the CRADA 
agreements would be less than or equal to the amount of permits for a given year.130  
Both of the Edmonds decisions provide parks the flexibility to engage in 
potential commercial benefits of the parks, but the cases set precedent that the 
researchers or companies cannot obtain profits from harvesting or mining the raw 
material.131 If the profits came from “the resources themselves,”132 then the plaintiffs 
would have won due to the prioritization of protecting the parks and the biodiversity 
within them. The profit from the microbial samples come from the research and the 
genetically modified results from the samples, unlike timber and mineral extraction 
where the organic resources are the goods themselves.133  
These cases are important because of the financial benefits involved in the 
CRADA Act, providing the parks financial benefits and resources.134 National Parks 
                                                            
 124  Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 93 F. Supp. 2d 63, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 125  Id. at 67 (quoting United Transp. Union v. Lewis, 711 F.2d 233, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
 126  Id. at 68.  
 127  Id. at 72.  
 128  Id.; see Weaver, supra note 110, at 71-72. 
 129  See Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Any specimen 
collected under this permit . . . may not be used for commercial purposes unless the permittee 
has entered into a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA) with the 
[relevant agency of the Department of Interior].”) (quoting Pls.’ Reply Brief, Ex. 1). 
 130  Id. at 7. 
 131  See Adair, supra note 2 at 131 (discussing the benefits of the U.S. resources in the field 
of biotechnology and if they should be used). 
 132  Edmonds Inst., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 72. 
 133  See Aseff, supra note 2, at 201 (“[N]on-naturally occurring organisms . . . are 
patentable . . . Under current U.S. law, genetically modified organisms obtained through 
bioprospecting are patentable.”).   
 134  Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 5. 
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have the potential to benefit greatly from the agreement, providing Yellowstone up 
to ten percent (10%) of future profits Diversa might make from bioprospecting 
profits.135 Yellowstone has lawfully issued permits to companies, and the park 
continues to issue permits to this day.136  
2. Utah 
Utah is the first state to pass bioprospecting legislation after Edmonds Institute v. 
Babbitt, and the laws passed with almost no opposition within the state’s 
legislature.137 The only other state to attempt to pass bioprospecting legislation is 
Hawaii, but the legislation failed due to relations with Hawaii’s indigenous 
population, addressed below.138 Unlike Hawaii, Utah went for a more economic tone 
while attempting to adapt to the CBD.139 Utah requires registration prior to 
bioprospecting.140 The state defines bioprospecting as “the removal from a natural 
environment for research or commercial use of naturally occurring microorganism, 
plant or fungus, or information concerning a naturally occurring microorganism’s, 
plant’s, or fungus’ physical or genetic properties.”141 The definition encompasses 
more than the D.C. District Court’s definition in Edmonds or Hawaii’s definition, 
and this shows Utah’s ability to incorporate the international views of bioprospecting 
into its statute. Keeping the definition broad and the statute vague or “skeletal” 
allows for the Act to be molded so that it may be more effective in the future.142   
Another key difference between Utah and Hawaii is that Utah has far fewer 
indigenous people.143 The bill was enacted stating that Utah owned its resources and 
not the people.144 Thus, companies have to enter into a contract with Utah and not 
with individual parties.145 Utah’s approach has worked for some CBD nations, as 
well.146 Because companies must set terms with the state, Utah can enforce “criminal 
                                                            
 135  Id.  
 136  See DeWeese, supra note 111, at 12-13. 
 137  UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 65A-14-101, 201, 202, 301 (2016); see also William M. Fischer, 
The Utah Bioprospecting Act of 2010: (Unintentional) State-Level Implementation of the 
United Nations Convention on Biodiversity, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 197, 200 
(2012).   
 138  See Fischer, supra note 137, at 205-06. See generally A NATION RISING: HAWAII 
MOVEMENTS FOR LIFE, LAND, AND SOVEREIGNTY (Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua et al. eds.,  
2014). 
 139  See Fischer, supra note 137, at 199-201.  
 140  Id. at 201. 
 141  Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-14-102 (2016)). 
 142  Id. at 202. 
 143  See id. at 205. 
 144  See id. at 202. 
 145  See id. at 201. 
 146  Like Utah, Brazil also requires that bioprospectors negotiate directly with the country, 
instead of individual parties. Brazil also requests that all of the activities involving genetic 
information and the traditional knowledge be recorded. Further, Brazil has enacted penalties 
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penalties, including payment of restitution, ‘proportional to the economic interests 
the state may have under [the Act].’”147 Through enforcing risks, Utah has the ability 
to regulate the bioprospectors and offers a means to deter individual companies from 
breaking their contracts.  
Utah regulates and implements its legislation through its administrative rule-
making body, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR).148 For a company to 
have access to Utah’s resources, the company must first register with the state.149 
After registration, a license is granted, and the parties have to enter a contract with 
Utah.150 Once granted, bioprospectors must provide information concerning the 
activity and the sites on which parties plan to bioprospect.151 The license is valid for 
twelve months and can be renewed after the period expires.152  
Utah’s DNR would discuss the royalty programs derived from bioprospecting 
through “good faith negotiations.”153 The state would receive any benefits a company 
may produce from future bioprospecting products or receive royalties from the 
extraction of such goods, like oil around the Salt Lake.154  
Authors have pointed out that the bill’s vagueness could have a detrimental effect 
on protecting the biodiversity of the land itself, calling for a more concrete set of 
rules.155 However, because it is the first bill of its time, vagueness might come in 
handy, especially because the overall objectives of the bill are set forth both in the 
legislative history and the original purpose in the bill. Critics argue that the bill was 
poorly drafted and question Utah’s ability to regulate without clear and convincing 
guidelines.156 However, ambiguity in the law allows Utah to test different approaches 
to see what works, and although the bill enacts the state’s rights within 
bioprospecting, there is room to address private property rights, which could be a job 
for future legislation.157 Utah is taking steps in the right direction and sets a 
                                                            
to protect this information. See Stephen Jenei, Brazilian Government Published Bill on 
Bioprospecting/Biopiracy, PATENT BARISTAS (Feb. 15, 2008), 
http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2008/02/15/brazilian-government-published-bill-on-
bioprospectingbiopiracy/. 
 147  Fischer, supra note 137, at 201 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-14-301 (2016)).  
 148  See id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-14-104 (2016)); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 652-150 
(2011). 
 149  See Fischer, supra note 137, at 201. 
 150  See id. 
 151  See id. 
 152  See id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-14-201 (2016)). 
 153  Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-14-202 (2016)). 
 154  See id. at 201-02. Due to the extreme habitats of the state, “research showed that 
organisms unique to Utah had great potential for profitable products and processes.” Id. at 
203.   
 155  See id. at 222. 
 156  See Goldman, supra note 101.  
 157  See Fischer, supra note 137, at 217, 222; see also Bang, supra note 23, at 74. 
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framework that other states can copy to include bioprospecting rights on their own 
soil.   
3. Hawaii 
Hawaii has a lot to offer bioprospectors, including its wealth of traditional 
knowledge, unique biodiversity, and promotion of the biotechnological sector.158 But 
because of its rich information and history, Hawaii should be worried about the 
stripping of these resources for any biotechnological advances that may be in high 
demand. Hawaii attempted to enact its own laws to protect against bioprospecting 
and the “tremendous loss of biodiversity.”159 Hawaii’s Constitution provides that 
“[a]ll public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the 
people,”160 so through this language, Hawaii attempted to put its resources in a trust 
for the state.161 However, Hawaii’s solution in creating a public trust ignores the 
private interest of the people indigenous to Hawaii who have a special connection to 
the state’s land and resources.162  
In its draft legislation, Hawaii defined bioprospecting as “the collection, removal, 
or use of biological and genetic resources of any organism, mineral, or other organic 
substance found within the public lands of the State and the state marine waters for 
scientific research or commercial development.”163 Hawaii attempted to functionally 
adopt the CBD’s guidelines and rules by making it a part of its new legislation.164 
Hawaiian indigenous people make up twenty-three percent (23%) of the 
population.165 The indigenous people have a significant amount of knowledge and a 
history with the land.166 The legislature has had some problems in the past deciding 
whether to give native Hawaiians special rights and protection when it comes to the 
patentability and extracting of resources and use of their traditional knowledge.167 
The indigenous population of Hawaii should be wary of bioprospecting because it 
“has harmed many of the estimated 300 million indigenous people worldwide.”168 
                                                            
 158  See Sarah K. Kam, Comment, Biopiracy in Paradise?: Fulfilling the Legal Duty to 
Regulate Bioprospecting in Hawai’i, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 387, 388 (2006). 
 159  S.B. 151, 24th Leg, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2007). 
 160  Id.   
 161  Id. 
 162  “Bioprospecting has adversely affected environments and indigenous peoples 
throughout the world, including the extinction of natural species and the unauthorized 
appropriation of traditional knowledge.” Kam, supra note 158, at 388.  
 163  Haw. S.B. 151. 
 164  Fischer, supra note 137, at 199-200. 
 165  Sara K. Goo, After 200 Years, Native Hawaiians Make a Comeback, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/06/native-hawaiian-population/ (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2016). 
 166  Id.  
 167  Kam, supra note 158, at 399. 
 168  Id. at 397. 
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Through these problems and the loose interpretation of the CBD, Hawaii has had 
trouble enacting any proactive legislation to help establish rights within the state.169 
In its enactment, Hawaii’s legislation faced more difficulties than Utah’s because 
the Hawaiian legislation could not only focus on the economic benefits like 
Utah’s.170 Hawaii must focus more on the preservation of biodiversity and traditional 
knowledge of native Hawaiians when enacting bioprospecting legislation.171 Hawaii 
has different values for bioprospecting legislation, which can make enacting and 
enforcing the legislation much more difficult compared to Utah’s plan above.172 
Hawaii’s history and cultural diversity make it more difficult to agree on how to 
protect the biodiversity and knowledge of the land.173 
However, Hawaii did not fail completely. In 2009, Hawaii started and continues 
to limit activity in the Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument.174 In order 
to manage and minimize human impact, the state initiated a permitting program, 
requiring all activities in the Monument (with limited exceptions) to obtain a 
permit.175 This small step shows Hawaii’s commitment to preserving its 
biodiversity.176 Indeed, this prohibition of bioprospecting without a permit in the 
Monument shows the state’s commitment.177 However, this legislation only protects 
                                                            
 169  Fischer, supra note 137, at 199-200 (“The Hawaiian statute failed, in part due to its 
lack of efficiently stringent benefits-sharing arrangements with the Hawaiian people.”). 
 170  Id.  
 171  Id. at 212. 
 172  Id. at 225. Hawaii’s interest to protect Native Hawaiian rights and knowledge is a state 
constitutional value. But there is disconnect between Native Hawaiians and the rest of the 
population. See Kenneth R. Conklin, Kahana Valley Giveaway—Just More of the Same, HAW. 
REP. (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.angelfire.com/big09a/KahanaGiveawayToEvilEmpire.html. 
 173  See generally NOELANI GOODYEAR-KA’OPUA, A NATION RISING: HAWAIIAN 
MOVEMENTS FOR LIFE, LAND AND SOVEREIGNTY (2014). Hawaii’s struggle between indigenous 
rights and public domain or public resources, shows the tension with which most international 
bioprospecting legislation has struggled. Indigenous people have known properties of certain 
organic material for hundreds of years while companies now are trying to figure out ways of 
extracting the those properties and commercializing them. See, e.g., Anupam Chander & 
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Doman, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331 (2004). 
 174  Resource Protection, PAPAHANAUMOKUAKEA MARINE NAT’L MONUMENT,  
http://www.papahanaumokuakea.gov/resource/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). 
 175  Permitting, PAPAHANAUMOKUAKEA MARINE NAT’L MONUMENT, 
http://www.papahanaumokuakea.gov/permit/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). 
 176  Id.  
 177  See Aseff, supra note 2, at 189-90. This does not mean that research in the area has 
stopped. Four new species of deep-water algae recently were found and sampled between 
2013-2015. See News and Events: New Algae Species Discovered in Hawaii’s Deep Waters, 
PAPAHANAUMOKUAKEA MARINE NAT’L MONUMENT,  
http://www.papahanaumokuakea.gov/news/new_species_algae.html (last visited Feb. 12, 
2016). 
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the northwest Hawaiian islands and does not protect the rest of Hawaii from the 
possible effects of bioprospecting.178 
III. ANALYSIS 
The U.S. would have much to gain through bioprospecting legislation. It is one 
of the biggest nations in world with varying climates, from arctic conditions in 
Alaska to tropical temperatutres in Hawaii and Florida. The U.S. also has reserved a 
lot of land for federal parks, started by Theodore Roosevelt to help preserve the 
nation’s lands.179 The National Park Service manages 79.6 million acres over 58 
national parks, with the largest being Wrangell-St. Elias National Park and Preserve 
in Alaska covering 13.2 million acres and the smallest being Thaddeus Kosciuszko 
National Memorial in Pennsylvania covering 0.02 acres.180 The parks receive over 
292 million visitors every year,181 showing that they are a national treasure and 
should be preserved. 
There are two distinct, overarching concerns throughout bioprospecting 
regulation literature. First, bioprospecting needs to be regulated to protect 
biodiversity182 Second, we must make sure indigenous people’s rights and 
knowledge are protected.183 The common denominator and threat in both of these 
aspects is commercialization and capitalism and how they can corrupt the indigenous 
peoples and the ecosystem.184 Due to the potential profitability of these resources, 
companies are going to want access to ecosystems that could be biotechnological 
gold.185    
After looking at all the options that states and the federal government have—and 
have not—taken to protect against bioprospecting, it is difficult to assemble a 
coherent structure that includes the nurturing nature of the CBD and the patentability 
aspirations of the WTO while respecting federal and state rights. A common thought 
throughout the literature, on both an international and national scale, is for the U.S. 
                                                            
 178  See Andrea Aseff, Hooray for No Bioprospecting in the NWHI!, KAHEA BLOG (Jun. 
24 2009, 6:52 PM), http://kahea.org/blog/hooray-for-no-bioprospecting-in-the-nwhi. 
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(last visited Dec. 4, 2015). 
 181  Id.   
 182  Id. 
 183  Traditional knowledge in the United States is not in danger because the natural resource 
itself cannot be patentable. However, the knowledge could expedite the patent process if 
researchers use it in attempts to extract and remake a chemical that can lead to a new drug or 
technology. See David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could be a Tool to Protect 
Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253 (2000). 
 184  Id.  
 185  See id. at 254-55 (“Traditional knowledge has been used in many industries as a 
starting point for new product development, in sectors such as specialty food, beverages, 
pharmaceuticals, agriculture, horticulture, and personal care and cosmetics; and it remains a 
significant resource for many commercial research and development programs.”).  
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
120 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:101 
 
to include prior informed consent as a part of the patentability process.186 But that 
still does not address the argument of who owns the biological material, which is 
where Congress’s original concern of property rights comes into play.187  
One of the main focuses for federal legislation is that it must incorporate the 
CBD ethics into the TRIPS process, which would allow the U.S. to focus on 
patentability and innovation through the WTO lens.188 The U.S. has stood by the 
TRIPS agreement, and any deviation would go against the pro-corporation mentality 
for the prioritization of the patent process.189 This is consistent with the American 
dream and fostering creativity and innovation of which the U.S. is a leader.190 
Because the TRIPS recommends incorporating PIC into a country’s regulations for 
the patent process, the U.S. could easily alter its patent process to match the 
protocol. It would be more beneficial, though, for the WTO to amend its rules; 
however, the implementing body, the Council of TRIPS committee, has no authority 
to do so.191 Thus, countries that have not ratified the CBD have no incentive, other 
than good will, to incorporate this extra step in their patent processes, which would 
make the U.S. patent process more burdensome.  
Without patents requiring disclosure of the genetic material or PIC, the U.S. 
patent process is incomplete when compared to other countries.192 By not specifically 
requesting the location an organic material was found, the process is negligent to the 
fact that materials could be found in a different place. Because there are multiple 
areas on the globe that could potentially have the ecosystem to support the microbial 
material, companies could make false claims on their applications. Further, there is 
no way to quickly and adequately test the legitimacy of where a microbial was 
found, especially when each sample is random and there is no guarantee of finding 
the same microbial needed for reproducing the genetic material from which the 
patent was derived.193 Also, the time and resources it would take to confirm the 
patent application are costly and counterintuitive.194    
                                                            
 186  See Chen, supra note 9; Pan, supra note 5. 
 187  See Bang, supra note 23, at 73. 
 188  See id.; Chen, supra note 9, at 10637. 
 189  Chen, supra note 9, at 10641 (“Plainly put, it is the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and not TRIPS or UPOV that winks at biopiracy.”). 
 190  See id. at 10635. 
 191  BITA AMANI, STATE AGENCY AND THE PATENTING OF LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
MERCHANTS AND MISSIONARIES IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY 223 (2009) (“They can only occur 
through waiver or amendment by its members but advisory opinions concerning members’ 
interpretation of TRIPS may be provided.”). 
 192  See Kabir S. Bavikatte & Morten W. Tvedt, Beyond the Thumbrule Approach: 
Regulatory Innovations for Bioprospecting in India, LEAD (2015), http://www.lead-
journal.org/content/15001.pdf.  
 193  See Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[M]icrobes 
present in a wide array of ecosystems and ‘systematically sample[]’ the sites in order of their 
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 194  See Grebe, supra note 43, at 369. 
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Even though there are possible ways get around this potential requirement in the 
patent process, the requirement could nevertheless be beneficial.  If the results are 
not completely accurate, the data derived from such legislation would allow an 
administrative body to track where potential profitable biodiversity is located.195 
Through the data, the U.S. would be able to protect areas susceptible to 
bioprospecting more adequately.  
The U.S. patent process does require that the information on the material, like 
general location, be disclosed within the patent process, along with a detailed 
explanation of the patent itself, including how to make it.196 A PIC would not be hard 
to implement under the U.S. patent process, and most researchers and companies 
would not have a problem enacting it, especially if corporations already had 
agreements, like CRADA between Yellowstone and Diversa.197 However, 
bioprospecting on private lands or with indigenous people would require more time 
and resources.198 The PIC is the easiest way to instill protection and more regulation 
of the areas where bioprospectors are collecting the information.   
In theory, however, once an organism is extracted from an area, additional 
samples of the same resource should not be needed, especially since the patentable 
material needs to be a product of human innovation and not nature.199 Changing 
patent regulation is not enough because that still does not regulate bioprospecting on 
public lands without other regulations to help aid the process.200 But not all 
biotechnology companies have the same access to the same microbial material, 
especially in areas where permits are required, such as Yellowstone and the 
Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument.201 Plus, certain companies may 
have an advantage over their competitors. For example, arguably Diversa, through 
the CRADA agreement with Yellowstone, has an advantage over competitors even 
though the agreement took eight years after the environmental impact assessment.202 
With biotechnology’s profitability potential, companies want to invest in research 
and development.203 Legislation and a more comprehensive program to combat 
bioprospecting can only help. Not only should the federal government regulate all 
national parks and monuments, but each individual state also should set up 
requirements to help regulate bioprospecting, like Utah.   
                                                            
 195  See Pan, supra note 5. 
 196  See Chen, supra note 9, at 10637. 
 197  See Bluemel, Substance Without Process, supra note 90, at 698. 
 198  See Bluemel, Separating Instrumental from Intrinsic, supra note 1, at 59. 
 199  See AMANI, supra note 191, at 86. 
 200  See id. at 89-90. 
 201  See DeWeese, supra note 111. 
 202  See Weaver, supra note 110. 
 203  Thomas A. Kursar, et al., Securing Economic Benefits and Promoting Conservation 
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One of the benefits for states or the federal government in enacting 
bioprospecting legislation is the possible economic benefit, such as those on which 
Utah’s legislation focused.204  Biotechnological advances potentially can be a billion 
dollar investment for a state.205  But greed also could be a motivating factor behind 
Utah’s legislation. Further, Utah only addresses public lands.206 If states or the 
federal government are only worried about the potential commercial benefit, they 
may overlook the reason why most bioprospecting bills are passed in the first 
place—to protect biodiversity loss and traditional knowledge for everyday uses. 
If the U.S. enacted a similar bill, it would only protect its lands and people and 
set the standard for U.S. corporations and their bioprospecting practices in other 
parts of the world.  This isolated effect is especially true because the U.S. did not 
sign either the CBD or the Kyoto agreement.207 The U.S. government purposely does 
not ratify certain agreements, so it has an excuse not to be held accountable.208 Even 
if other nations put pressure on the U.S., the U.S. government does not bend to the 
international community.209 This shows a lack of leadership on environmental issues, 
especially when the U.S. has the potential to impact those issues.210 
Because the U.S. did not sign the CBD or Kyoto agreement, the U.S. government 
has free reign to enact legislation how it sees fit, which may be a reason why no 
comprehensive, federal legislation has been enacted.211 Due to this inaction, states 
like Utah and Hawaii have taken the initiative to help protect their resources from 
the biotechnical world even though each state has enacted different forms of such 
legislation.212 Utah established a comprehensive framework that is still pretty new 
and vague.213 Although Fischer, a critical scholar on the topic, calls for open debate 
and policy initiatives, there are clear strategies that the U.S. should have already 
                                                            
 204  See Fischer, Utah Bioprospecting Act, supra note 137, at 212-13. 
 205  See id. at 202. 
 206  Id. at 200.  
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 208  See id. at 73. 
 209  See id. at 72.  
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incorporated into its federal policy and requested that states follow with assisting 
legislation for the protection of biodiversity.214 
If the federal government continues to remain inactive on this question, states 
should protect themselves and their resources. Utah took steps to make this a reality, 
and Hawaii has desperately tried to come up with a balance between native 
Hawaiians’ rights and the rights of rest of its population.215 Each state should tailor 
its bioprospecting laws on the state’s individual needs. The need for bioprospecting 
in Alaska, which is rich in arctic biodiversity, would be different than the needs in a 
more commercially developed state like New York.216   
The drawback would be that each state would need to enact its own regulation, 
which may not be a priority for the state’s legislature, especially since it is not a 
federal priority. Even though companies would have to follow the individual rules of 
each state, if the states follow a contract formula for private and state actors, the 
varying pieces of legislation among the states would incorporate a well-known area 
of law with the new rules and regulations of bioprospecting.217 Even though a 
comprehensive federal plan may be easier, companies doing business in multiple 
states already have to adapt themselves to the needs of individual states.218  Plus, if 
they are investing money into the research and development of a microorganism for 
potential profits, they can surely invest in a lawyer.   
However, a comprehensive federal framework could create regulations that 
would easily transfer from state to state. All states would have to do is ratify or adopt 
the federal legislation.  The dilemma between federal and state action only calls for a 
“continued emphasis on piecemeal bioprospecting diverts attention from more 
valuable remedies for the biodiversity crisis.”219 Even though both are possible 
options, the reality is that something should be done about bioprospecting. Other 
countries that have bioprospecting frameworks are also part of the CBD, putting the 
U.S. in a league of its own for creating and enforcing its laws.220 Federal and most 
state governments have still not answered Congress’s problems and aspects about 
bioprospecting.221  
There has been little conversation in the U.S. as to protecting indigenous tribes’ 
rights and traditional knowledge when it comes to bioprospecting, as well as 
identifying personal property rights, which is a fundamental right.222 Property owners 
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with a vast amount of acreage would benefit from PIC and the opportunity to receive 
economic benefits from biotech companies, like in Utah the system has initiated.223 
Contract law could help bridge the knowledge gap between indigenous and private 
owners’ cooperation with biotechnical companies.224 A contract between the 
bioprospectors and the landowners (either private parties or indigenous groups) 
would help enforce the rights of the landowners and provide protection against the 
bioprospecting actions varying from the agreement.225 The indigenous tribes or 
private property owners would have grounds for legal action if a part of the contract 
was not followed or not included within the contract, which could also bring 
economic compensation for use of their land.226   
The downside to bringing contract theory into the bioprospecting debate is the 
lack of knowledge concerning the contracts and certain loopholes corporate 
attorneys may draft to exploit the other party. However, unless heavily incentivized, 
the more legal jargon written into a contract for land use, the wearier a person will be 
to sign the contract due to the binding nature of the legal document. Plus, clauses 
that would allow an indigenous tribe or individuals to cancel the contract if they are 
unhappy with a bioprospector’s actions can potentially rectify the issue of 
corporations using the contract for exploitation of the land.   
The other problem, other than rights to the land, is rights to the information that 
indigenous communities have known and have passed down for generations. Most of 
the literature suggests that indigenous tribes should be compensated for their 
knowledge and the resources their lands provide.227 Although the literature provides 
helpful recommendations, the suggestions fail to consider that those communities 
need protection from the outside world.  Even though indigenous communities keep 
to themselves, the potential exploitation for commercial use of an indigenous tribe’s 
resources or knowledge calls for a greater protection from the government of the 
indigenous community. Indigenous tribes want the profit-sharing benefits, but they 
do not want those benefits to come at the expense of their land or traditions.228 
Indigenous communities have a source of pride and respect for their land and the 
need to take care of it.229 Thus, a bioprospector wanting to research a certain plant 
within the indigenous community’s property needs to be regulated with the 
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indigenous community on a case-by-case basis. The bioprospector will probably be 
interested in any traditional knowledge a community may have with the plant to help 
expedite the research process, which should include additional compensation and 
credit prior to any profits made from the potential bioprospecting finding. The 
relationship should also include, if the resource is valuable, any profits from use of 
the extracted chemical that may be used in new biotechnology or medication.   
There is limited discussion on preventing the outside world’s meddling into 
indigenous communities. There is also limited discussion on allowing the indigenous 
communities to co-own patents, which the traditional knowledge helped drive. 
Without a dialogue between the indigenous communities, the government, and 
potential profit seekers, the indigenous communities will continue to be 
marginalized for lack of information and care concerning the indigenous interests 
and interests of the land.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
Preserving the world’s biodiversity is important for present and future 
generations. Creating new biotechnological advances to cure the world of ailments is 
also important for these generations. The U.S. needs to enact legislation that can do 
both. The lack of regulation will only hurt biodiversity and people in the long run. 
The U.S. must prioritize regulations to guard against biopiracy and help researchers 
find materials that might lead to other miracles.230 Even if there is no federal action, 
individual states can legislate their own bioprospecting rules to regulate according to 
their needs. Only through trial and error will a government know what does and does 
not work, but inaction on bioprospecting will not protect biodiversity.231 Maybe now 
that a celebrity is promoting action, something may get done.232  
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